




f(s) = As + B
•~k
\: (!.k) = L ~i X ki + bk '
i=l
then the solution of the optimization pr~blem (27) is a
piece-wise linear' function Qk • In this case the reduced game
can be solved easily as i t is shown in [lOJ, pp. 43-44 •
•5. Multiproduct oligopoly game
In this paragraph we will consider the game having the
sets of strategies
~ = [o, ~CLlJ
end pa.y-off functions
x ••• x (30 )
n




ll) lM))~ = Xk '···'Xk '
n n
9 Cfm) = 0, L ri-1) x ••• x 0, L: LiMl , R(fm)CRl for
t=l e=1
k=1,2 •••• ,n and 1Il=1 , 2, •• , M. This game can come up if the
factories manufacture differ~nt p~ducts and sell them on the
same market. Let M be the number of products, and 1et x~m) ,
~) be the p~duction level and capacity limit of factory k
f~m p~duct m. If f donotes the unit price of p~duct m, than
m
it is assumed that f is a function of the total production
m
levels of the different products. The function y~ is tbe
- J2 -
an~ ~3lng tn~ aOOV6 _erminology tne incorne
V~ fa." .ory k ..... oJ.ven oy function (Jl).
3imilar lnterprètation c~~ be given to the other applications
sh~/~ ~ the section àealing with the classical oligopoly game
but ìiffe=ent aualities of water ~~d waste-water have to be
•
introduceci.
':"..e :'ollc.'I(ing ~sul t is basic in the theory of mul tiproàuct




Lemma 11., Let g, be a vector'-vector' function such that
rv:
of Rb(~) is a convex set in the nonnegative orthant
M7I,l~IC R • Assume that the components of g,
continuously differentiable. Let J
-
-
be the Jacobian matrix
of g. Ii !I
-
~ ~ .9(~I,
'!'(~) + II l~)- is nonnegative semidefinite for arbitrary
then the function
h(~) = ~T gl~)
lS concave.
(J2)
FroofL Let \J denote the gradient operation. Then simple
calculations show that
T TV h(~) = g ~) + ~ II (~) •
Since the components of g, are concave, we have
(JJ)






- (ii. - ~l· ~(~)(;y - ~).
(34 )
The ~nequalities (3)) ,(34) •ana imply
'"l- {g(iL) - gl~\} ~
consequently
- ~ l,
wh::.cÌ! and equation ()2) c·~veo the inequality
Thus function h is concave.
As a corollary to this general r~sult we can prove the
main resul t of this see H '1n.
•




Jacobian of f. Assume that fune tions f and ~ (l ::.. k ~ !l) are
continuous)the components of f are continuously differentiable
and concave, ~ is convex and for arbitrary ~ ~ ~(f) tr-e
T
+ ~t~) is nonnegative semidefinite. Then the
game has at least one equilibrium point.
Preof. Since ~ ~s a closed, convex, boundeQ subset of
concave in ~k' the game satisfies all conditions
NikaiQo-Isoda theorem. Thus the game has at least
equilibrium point.
•





Remark. The theorem does not g~ve numerical methods for
the determination of the equilibrium point. But in the linear
case a very efficient algorithm can be constructed which is a
"generalization of the method of M. Manas given for the one-
-product case.
Let us assume that
'. ( (l) (M))I,.u. S ,,, •• ,8









- L xk •
k=l
1et us intr'Oduce the
following notations: ~(m)









, fl. = al.. -l .
-,U. "" , m-
is nonnegative semidefinite.
Under the above condi tions the game has at least one equilibrium
point, and since
H (H ii)!. = !l'···'!n
only if
•
'f k is concave in ~k' a vec toro
is an equilibrium point of the game if and





> O for lffi)ii ~m) (~ k,m) (35)él x Cm) xk ----
k








/ , . , x'Y-' (\ (36 )I v " . '>- ... ~V') k •)z,
K \
I ~ - otherwisev--
\..
• ..; ..;' xV-) ..- • (t<)
-
v





then oy calculating the partial derivatives of -t k 'N e can
easily verify that the conditions (35) are equivalent to the
set of equations (see [lO] pp. 46-47)
b,u. + + zrl - O (37)
for J-l-=1,2, ••• ,M; k=1,2, ••• ,n , where
n
slw) = L x~m).
k=l
The above system can be written ~n a simpler form if we
introduce the following notations:
"'~ = ( xpl , ••• ,x~M) , ••• ,x~l), •••• ,x~M)r
a = ( III CM) (l) (Ml)T
_ Al' ••• , Al t ••• t An , •••• , An
"'( \.Il (M) (l) CM)) •! = vI'···' vI'···' vn , ••• , vn
(38 )
_ ( ll)~ - zl' ... , (MI2 1 t···'
(l)
zn , ••• ,
- 36 -
Y:. = ( w?\ t ',l) ll) W~M) ) T... , Wl • ... , wn , ••• t
-
. ll) '1'[M) III L(M) ) ~
.{,
- l Lì ,••• , Ll • ... , Ln ', ••• ,- n






Ful"thermore let P denote the Mn x Mn matl"ix
-
-
I • ATA A • \I ••• I
-
- - - •








then the relations (36). (37), (38) have the forrr:
r x + b - a - v T Z = O
-- - - - - -
Z + W - ~-
- -
T T T Ox Z v W - V Z
- - -
- - - - - -
(39)
x, v, Z, w




Thus we have proven the following r'esul1;.
Lemma 12•. A vector ::.s an equilibrium point , .'01 tl1e
linear oligopoly game with nonnegative definite








conditions (39) are satisfied with ii~=!.,y.= Jt iiV • W = W
- - -
and z = z* •
- -
In a furthel" special case the uruqueness of the equilibl"iu:n
point is assured, as it is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 8. Assume that matrix A is symmetric, negative
-
definite. Then the game has a unique e qui li brium poir.t.
Proof., Let us consider the quadratic :programnung problem
- 37 -
o , x ~ I:











P::-rs t we pr-ove tha <: problem (4 O) i s astri:; t::' -,- :; onvex
-
progI'a.mJJUng problen:. h is sufficient tO prove tilat n:atrix !'
-
,-
'f" - ( )L!R,·m~s ne(;at~ve ue =~te • .uet ~ = l:!1' ••••1!.n ~ , 'Nhere
for k=1.2 ••••• n. Then
~ r: ~_.
--
~ L T L In• "- ,1,;, p 1,;, - ti " l:!k + 1;.~ A u.- n I -
-
-






L T i ~ - L,- u, A u + I u, A u_ < \)-K - -k -~ -,- - v
k-' i-l j-l-,!,
-- --




~s symmetric, then obviously f ~s ..a..so
symmetric.
llext we ODserve that conùitions (39) without equat~on
':f..T ~ = O are the Kuhn-Tucker condi tions of che quadratic
progr~ng problem (see G. Hadley (31). and since it is
convex. the Kuhn-Tucker condi tions ar'e necessary and sufficient
conàitions for tile optimality. The fact that the matrix






solution. and since the game has an equilibrium point whicn
must satisfy system D9) we conclude that the unique solution
of (40) gives the ~que solution of (39). which is the ~que
equilibrium point of the game.
Remark. The numerical solution of problem (40)
obtained by standard methods (see G. Hadley (31).
can De
- 38 -
Fina.l1y we remark that the statements of Lemma 12. and
Theorem 8. can be extended for the multiproduct group equi1ibrium
prob1em, but the detai1s ar'e not discussed here.
